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Abstract Nanoparticles have multifaceted advan-
tages in drug administration as vaccine delivery and
hence hold promises for improving protection of
farmed fish against diseases caused by pathogens.
However, there are concerns that the benefits associ-
ated with distribution of nanoparticles may also be
accompanied with risks to the environment and
health. The complexity of the natural and social
systems involved implies that the information ac-
quired in quantified risk assessments may be inade-
quate for evidence-based decisions. One controversial
strategy for dealing with this kind of uncertainty is the
precautionary principle. A few years ago, an
UNESCO expert group suggested a new approach
for implementation of the principle. Here we compare
the UNESCO principle with earlier versions and
explore the advantages and disadvantages by employ-
ing the UNESCO version to the use of PLGA
nanoparticles for delivery of vaccines in aquaculture.
Finally, we discuss whether a combined scientific and
ethical analysis that involves the concept of respon-
sibility will enable approaches that can provide a
supplement to the precautionary principle as basis for
decision-making in areas of scientific uncertainty,
such as the application of nanoparticles in the
vaccination of farmed fish.
Keywords Theprecautionaryprinciple.Ethics.
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Responsibility
Introduction
Biocompatible and biodegradable polymer-based par-
ticles may be advantageous for drug delivery pur-
poses and medicinal applications. Of these polymers,
polylactides (PLA) and poly (−lactide-co-glycolide)
(PLGA) have been the most extensively investigated
for drug delivery [29]. Polymeric nanoparticles have
several advantages in vaccine delivery; they can
provide sustained delivery of vaccines, they can
solubilize drugs for intravascular delivery, and they
can improve solubility of vaccine antigens against
enzymatic degradation. PLGA encapsulated DNA
encoding antigens are protected against enzymatic
digestion and can therefore be released over extended
periods of time. Within aquaculture one of the most
important constraints for further growth is the
prevalence of diseases. This has caused intensive
search for novel and improved vaccines. One new
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delivery of vaccines, as for example PLGAs. Most
projects involving the use of PLGAs is still under
development, and has been most extensively studied
for human and animal use where rodents is used as
research animal, while only a few studies has been
published where fish is the main target [37]. On the
other hand, there is at present limited scientific
understanding of the mechanisms underlying uptake
and persistence of PLGA as nanoparticles after
injection into an animal [29]. Main areas of uncer-
tainty are with regard to the immunological and
toxicological impact, biodistribution and degradabil-
ity after injection and whether the polymeric nano-
particles can be distributed to the environment. The
present lack of scientific understanding of the health
and environmental effects of distribution of nano-
particles involves a challenge with regard to risk
assessment and management.
PLGAs have at the macrolevel been used in
medical applications and hence provide some under-
standing with regard to persistence, distribution and
side-effects [1]. When we turn to the use of PLGA for
delivery of vaccines at the nanolevel, new questions
arise. For example whether the reduction of size
involves new uncertainties, if the use on a new target
animal, fish, may cause novel effects and if the
particles can spread to surrounding environments with
unforeseen consequences. All these questions are
relevant with regard to identification of potential
harmful consequences when PLGAs are used in
vaccines. One controversial strategy for dealing with
this kind of uncertainty in regulation is the precau-
tionary principle, which will be the main topic of the
subsequent discussion.
Given that we have different degrees of knowledge
regarding assumptions of harmful consequences, it is
reasonable that these possible harms should be dealt
withaccordingtodifferentprinciples.Incaseswherewe
have sufficient experience to quantify the probabilities,
risk assessments is the commonly accepted way to
handle the problems. There are of course different
degreesofsubjectivityregardingtheestimatesaswellas
the value assessments involved, but these are usually
handled by a scientifically based discourse. In cases of
uncertainty one can argue for the use of different
principles, including a more or less subjectively based
version of risk assessment, given that the usual
experiential basis for quantifying risk is deficient. An
alternative is the conservative maximin or minimax
principle, proposing that one should minimize maxi-
mum harm. In the international governance debate,
however, the majority has supported different versions
of the precautionary principle.
But it is not obvious that these methods for dealing
with uncertainty are relevant for the issue we are facing,
namely how to handle the possible risks in nanotechnol-
ogy application such as the use of PLGA particles in fish
vaccination. A case can be made that we are primarily in
a situation of scientific ignorance regarding nanotech-
nology, and that we have no basis for making plausible
hypotheses about causal relationships and mechanisms
leading to harm. What we are left with may be mere
unfoundedspeculationswhereoneguessmaybeas good
as the next, and given that technology applications will
lead to harm, they may be of a radically different nature
from the ones proposed at such early stages. If this is the
case, precaution is not an alternative, as all versions of
the principle demand some kind of plausible harm
scenario as basis for instigating precautionary measures.
This line of argument has some merit in regard to
nanotechnology in general. We are in a state of
ignorance regarding both the benefits and harms that
may result from this interdisciplinary research in a
wide rangeoftechnologyareas. Thisproblemisnotthe
same regarding particular technology applications, or
at least, not all of them. The case we are discussing is
one where we can draw up some plausible harm
scenarios based on what we know about the particles in
question from the use at the macrolevel, as well as
knowledge within vaccinology and about farmed
salmon and marine ecology. Although some harm
scenarios are beyond precaution due to deficient
knowledge, others clearly are not. We will assume that
the epistemic conditions are on a scale from probable
harm scenarios which should be subjected to risk
assessment, via plausible harm scenarios calling for
some kind of precautionary or related regulatory
measures, to more or less speculative scenarios where
potential harm is a matter of speculation, similar to the
hyping of potential nanotechnology benefits. In this
latter case, there is no scientific basis for regulatory
measures. But there are a number of issues concerning
the use of PLGA nanoparticles in fish vaccines that
should be classified as a matter of scientific uncertain-
ty, and in these cases there are grounds for suggesting
some kind of regulation even in the absence of data
enabling quantified risk assessments.
74 Nanoethics (2011) 5:73–86The precautionary principle has been accepted by
many national governments as a basis for policy-
making, and it has become important both in
international environmental law and international
treaties [5,10,11,38]. Implementation of the precau-
tionary principle entails three interrelated proposals:
the first one concerns caution in the face of
application of new technology, the other emphasizes
the importance of conducting risk associated research,
and the third entails that precautionary actions need to
be taken. In this paper our focus is on the first
proposal –the policy decision to trigger the precau-
tionary principle. The implementation of the precau-
tionary principle in political decisions is and has been
a subject of heated scientific and public controversies
[17,34]. So-called weak versions are criticized as
being vacuous. The paradigmatic example is found in
the declaration issued by the Rio Conference on
Environment and Development:
‘Where there are threats of serious or irrevers-
ible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation’ [50]
The formulation ‘lack of full scientific certainty’
implies that some degree of scientific certainty is
required. But when there is some certainty, it is
usually possible to make fairly good risk assessments,
and precaution becomes superfluous. The demand of
cost-effectiveness is also held to undermine the
reduced burden of proof required to instigate precau-
tionary measures.
Strong versions are argued to be detrimental to
scientific and economic development. These ver-
sions are held to place unreasonable regulatory
burdens on new technology utilization, reducing
returns from innovation, limit utilization of tech-
nology worldwide and providing disincentives for
research. A typical example is the Wingspread
version:
‘When an activity raises threats of harm to
human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause-
and-effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically. In this context, the proponent of
an activity, rather than the public, should bear
the burden of proof.’ [41]
Adding to this criticism of the principle as being
either too weak or too strong is the number of
competing definitions of the precautionary principle,
leading to further difficulties for implementation in
legislation and employment in actual cases. In the
following we intend to highlight some advantages and
disadvantages with the UNESCO version compared
to other versions of the precautionary principle, using
PLGA particles for delivery of vaccines as a case
study. We will argue that the UNESCO version of the
precautionary principle evades some of the conse-
quences that have been criticized in earlier versions.
However, also the UNESCO version has problematic
aspects that we will describe. Moreover, we discuss to
what extent a combined scientific and ethical analysis
that involves the concept of responsibility will
improve the basis for decision-making under scientif-
ic uncertainty and thereby contribute to a socially
robust development and application of nanoparticles
for delivery of vaccines.
The Precautionary Principle; The Adequacy
of Weak and Strong Versions
The precautionary principle is a normative principle
for making practical decisions under conditions of
scientific uncertainty. Gardiner [15] suggests that the
following elements are essential to the principle:
& Threat of harm
& Uncertainty of impact or causality
& Precautionary response
As we can see this raises a host of questions, with
regard to how to define harm, how to assess and
systematize uncertainty and when and how to initiate
a precautionary response. The actual content of the
precautionary principle and the practical implications
of its implementation in policy issues are controver-
sial [14,35,54]. Several formulations of the principle,
ranging from ecocentric to anthropocentric, and from
risk-adverse to risk-taking positions, have been put
forward.
Weak versions of the precautionary principle are
often grounded in narrow utilitarian ethics, and
applications involve risk/cost-benefit analyses. In this
context, the principle may be used as an option to
manage risks when they have been identified through
risk analysis. For example, the Rio Declaration
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similar wording has been reproduced in the preamble
of the Convention on Biological Diversity and in
article 3 of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change. Strong versions are active in nature, shift the
burden of proof to the proponents of the activity and
oblige regulators to take action, for instance by
implementation of risk management procedures [54].
Weak versions of the principle are criticized as
vacuous, whereas strong versions are often considered
too narrow, focusing on environmental risk without
considering the costs of existing practices to the
environment or taking into account relevant non-
environmental concerns [15,25]. For instance, em-
ployment of a weak version of the precautionary
principle to PLGA as carriers of vaccines in aquacul-
ture would focus on the proposed benefits while the
potential risks to health and the environment would
be downplayed due to the present lack of scientific
understanding. Weiss [52] demonstrates the motiva-
tion behind weak approaches when he states, ‘desir-
able innovations can be blocked by an excess of
precaution’. He proposes to prevent this excess by
introducing ‘a new principle of Innovation and
Adaptive management, to the effect that precautionary
action should not unreasonably interfere with an
innovation that promises major benefits until the
dangers and benefits of this innovation are well
understood’ [52]. Postponing intervention waiting
for evidence of harm, as Weiss suggests, empties the
precautionary principle of content. This demonstrates
that a ‘wait-and-see-strategy’ is opposed to the
precautionary principle, and must rather be regarded
as an alternative strategy. Postponing intervention
may in some circumstances be an option depending
on the state of understanding and the possibility for
reversibility of the hazards caused by the technology.
The wait-and see-strategy as a way to undermine the
rationale of precaution is a common criticism of weak
versions. If the PLGA nanoparticles showed promis-
ing results in vaccination, the version would recom-
mend use even if there were plausible grounds for
suspecting environmental harm, as long as the basis
for determining the level of harm was insufficient.
On the other hand, a strong precautionary assess-
ment of polymeric nanoparticles applications for
example based on the Wingspread statement, would
tend to emphasize the risks of using them, neglecting
detrimental effects of the existing vaccination practi-
ces, as well as the potentially positive effect of more
effective vaccines for food production and enhance-
ment of animal welfare.
Although there is leveled reasonable critique
against strong and weak versions, the complex
challenges by scientific uncertainties must be dealt
with in some way or another. First, because there is
general agreement that we are politically and
morally obliged to avoid foreseeable harm [20].
Second, because the present controversy on how to
deal with unintended effects due to employment of
new technology is an issue that we need to resolve
on its own account [9]. Furthermore, full certainty
about potential unintended health and environmental
effects is unattainable prior to full-scale employment
of the technology. The complexity of animal and
environmental systems implies that the information
achieved by doing laboratory research and in risk
assessment is not adequate for evidence-based
decisions. Thus, the reasons for introducing the
precautionary principle, namely how to approach
and acknowledge lack of scientific understanding in
political decisions, is as relevant today as in the
early Nineties.
Implementation of the Precautionary Principle
The implementation of the precautionary principle
requires that there are indications of adverse impacts,
and that risk-associated research is initiated. Hence,
indications of adverse impacts must be documented in
a scientifically acceptable way before a precautionary
measure can be initiated. What is held to be
acceptable evidence for action differs markedly in
weak and strong versions of the precautionary
principle. For example, Article 15(1) of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety states that;
‘Risk assessments undertaken pursuant to this
Protocol shall be carried out in a scientifically
sound manner … Such risk assessments shall be
based, at a minimum, on information provided
in accordance with Article 8 and other available
scientific evidence in order to identify and
evaluate the possible adverse effects of living
modified organisms on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking
also into account risks to human health.’
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connected to quantifiability, and scientific soundness
is likewise associated with quantified science. For
instance, a typical example of a systematized quanti-
fied risk approach to genetically modified organisms
is the principle of substantial equivalence [27]. As
long as we are talking about risk, quantified evidence
means measuring probability of an identified undesir-
able effect. By demanding scientific evidence before
employing the precautionary principle, the Biosafety
Protocol requires documentation indicating that the
genetically modified organism in question causes
harm to health or the environment.
The EC communication on the precautionary
principle [10], on the other hand, focuses on the
quality of the information. A focus on the quality of
information relates to what type of scientific under-
standing is known and what there is a lack of
information about—without requiring ‘degrees’ or
‘levels’ of proof, expressed as quantified probabili-
ties. Hence, scientific uncertainty and indications of
harm would be enough for acceptance of employ-
ment of the precautionary principle. The first
approach corresponds to a weak version of the
principle, whereas the second indicates a strong
version. The weak version demands measurements,
which presupposes that we possess the kind of
knowledge that would make precaution superfluous.
Accordingly, we would be better off with standard
risk assessments. However, the strong version may
open up for endless negotiations as to what is
uncertain and unknown, as well as what should
count as indications of the ‘unknown’. In addition,
the strong versions tend to overemphasize the
potential adverse impact of the proposed action as
compared to the situation this action seeks to amend
or improve, resulting in a presumption for postpone-
ment of technology implementation based on an
arguably one-sided risk focus.
Thus, a demand that there need to be available
scientific information to determine whether precau-
tionary steps should be taken, fails to evade the
criticism of weak versions of the principle for
being vacuous. On the other hand, the postpone-
ment of scientific assessments in the strong
versions combined with the myopic focus on
indications of environmental risk, may fail to
balance the risks with benefits or, in other cases,
risks of non-action.
The UNESCO Version of the Precautionary
Principle
The recent UNESCO report on the precautionary
principle [49] may indicate a promising middle
ground between the present strong and weak versions.
One reason is that it gives a thick description of the
issues at stake, incorporating various ethical values
concerning intra- and inter-generational equity, envi-
ronmental responsibility, sustainable development and
stakeholder participation. The UNESCO version
replaces scientific probability with plausibility, and
also emphasizes that uncertainty is the trigger for
application of the precautionary principle. Further-
more, it defines the limits of the principle by stating
that ‘if a hypothesis posits radically new and
unfamiliar mechanisms and processes, it is not
plausible’; in which case the principle is not relevant.
Moreover, the UNESCO principle involves evaluation
of the consequences of both action and inaction in a
participatory process. Accordingly some of the pitfalls
of both weak and strong versions seem to be avoided:
‘When human activities may lead to morally
unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible
but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or
diminish that harm.
Morally unacceptable harm refers to harm to
humans or the environment that is
– threatening to human life or health, or
– serious and effectively irreversible, or
– inequitable to present or future generations, or
– imposed without adequate consideration of the
human rights of those affected.
The judgment of plausibility should be grounded
in scientific analysis. Analysis should be ongoing
so that chosen actions are subject to review.
Uncertainty may apply to, but need not be
limited to, causality or the bounds of the
possible harm.
Actions are interventions that are undertaken
before harm occurs that seek to avoid or
diminish the harm. Actions should be chosen
that are proportional to the seriousness of the
potential harm, with consideration of their
positive and negative consequences, and with
an assessment of the moral implications of both
action and inaction. The choice of action should
be the result of a participatory process.’
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more comprehensive account than the ones we have
discussed above. It is specific concerning what kind
of harm that is basis for precautionary action, thus
evading the critique that the principle is either too
vague or too demanding. Unlike weak versions, the
UNESCO principle does not demand scientific
certainty or evidence of benefits and harm prior to
action. Unlike strong versions it does not focus
only on the negative potential of the proposed
activity, but requires an assessment of inaction as
well as action. This version involves no shift of the
burden of proof, as the Wingspread statement does,
and is arguably less problematic concerning tech-
nology implementation.
Still, this version may face the charge of being
unclear on key issues, at least if the precautionary
principle is intended to be action guiding. This is
clearly the case with the phrase ‘morally unacceptable
harm’ and its specifications ‘threatening to life or
health’, ‘serious and irreversible’ and ‘inequitable’.
Some guidance is however given in the UNESCO
report by its reference to participatory mechanisms
and democratic pluralism and the insistence on the
need for case-based reflective value judgments: ‘A
strength of the precautionary principle being a
principle is its open-endedness and flexibility, which
creates a possibility and an incentive for social
learning.’ (p.51). In the following we will further
elaborate on these points, bearing in mind that the
report proposes a procedure rather than a recipe for
dealing with particular cases of scientific uncertainty
regarding harm, using introduction of PLGA for
delivery of vaccines in aquaculture as our case study.
Threatening to Human Life or Health
The purpose of vaccination is to protect fish against
disease, with the intention to improve animal welfare
and the economy of aquaculture. All fish in
commercial aquaculture is meant for human con-
sumption, hence this raises the issue of safety for
consumption. To the best of knowledge of the
authors no studies on the implications of eating
PLGA mediated vaccinated fish exists. If, however,
someone presented a scientifically plausible scenario
of the PLGA nanoparticles not being fully degraded
and having toxic effects, we have a situation similar
to the scientific controversy surrounding the uncer-
tainties of the effects on human and animal health
by consumption of genetically modified foods.
Although highly contested within science [13,51],
there are reasonable scientific arguments for caution,
for example based on documented unintended effects
in different kinds of breeding and gene modification,
combined with the fact that absence of proof of harm
is not equal to proof of absence of harm. But this falls
back on the question of how to decide that an
indication of harm is to be considered scientifically
plausible. Only the scientific community can decide
that, and as stated in the UNESCO version ‘The
judgment of plausibility should be grounded in
scientific analysis’. However, as illustrated above
there are significant disagreements between scientists
on matters such as these, depending on their training
and work context [28]. What is plausible for one
scientist is highly unlikely for another, depending on
their perspective. One could counter this by saying
that a situation with scientific disagreement and
different perspectives on the relevance of the uncer-
tainties involved leaves us in a state of ignorance and
ambiguity and thus beyond the conditions for using
the UNESCO principle. But then the principle will
have a very restricted validity area compared to most
versions of the precautionary principle, and we are
still left with the problem to determine what can be
characterized as uncertainty and what as ignorance
and ambiguity.
Serious and Effectively Irreversible
In a similar vein, what is to count as serious harm to
nature is based on contestable value judgments that
are not self- evident. Mankind has always interacted
with nature and done alterations to the natural
environment for better or worse. Since nature can be
described as an indefinite number of interconnected
self-adjusting biological systems, ‘harm’ becomes
context-dependent. Destruction of some elements of
an ecosystem, inevitably gives advantages to other
elements, ensuring that harm in most cases is
simultaneously a benefit. For instance, farmed salmon
will escape or be released, and the escaped salmon
will compete with wild salmon for food, habitats and
spawning grounds. Escaped farmed salmon may also
spread parasites and diseases and through mating with
wild salmon change the genetics of the wild salmon
population [12].
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salmon population can cause reduced mean fitness
and lower reproductivity. At present we do not know
whether the PLGA particles and vaccination will
affect salmon reproducibility or survival in wild, but
the possibility cannot be ruled out. Assuming im-
proved fitness of farmed salmon, some would say that
the escape of salmon with subsequent depletion of the
wild stock due to interbreeding and competition,
represent no harm. We still have wild salmon,
although somewhat different from the original variety.
Others will consider this to represent serious harm
since a) the genetic interaction will result in reduced
genetic diversity (although this may be contested),
and b) the escaped farm salmon will replace the wild
relative, which is problematic for our distinctions
between nature and culture, expressed in the value
placed by most people on the idea of naturalness. In
this particular sense the escapee is less natural than
the native salmon.
Clearly we cannot determine what is a serious
interference with nature, and certainly not what is to
count as serious harm unless we determine which
aspects of nature and its functioning that is to be
regarded as worth preserving as it is today. Thus the
question of serious harm is correlated to conceptions
of how to maintain and preserve nature and biodiver-
sity [4]. The vagueness makes specific value based
discussions needed which is also argued for in the
UNESCO version of the principle. However, an
environmental change does not necessarily imply an
adverse effect as illustrated above with the case of
escapes by farmed salmon. Hence we question
whether participatory processes can guide the choice
of action in such cases, and that consensus in society
regarding the nature of harm to the environment can
be achieved. Furthermore, such processes may only
include those effects that are valued by the society as
negative as for instance effects on specific species as
butterflies etc. and leave out impacts on ecosystem as
well as abiotic components.
Moreover, even if we agree on some change as
clearly harmful, the phrase “irreversible harm” is
difficult to use in an uncontroversial technology
assessment. For instance, the PLGA particles may
be distributed by escape or release of vaccinated fish,
and by accidental release of the vaccine. In aquatic
environments use of PLGAs may be irreversible since
they can be distributed over vast areas, distances, and
possibly pass physical and physiological barriers.
However, as polyesters in nature, these polymers
undergo hydrolysis after administration, forming
biologically compatible and metabolizable moieties
(lactic acid and glycolic acid) that are eventually
removed from the body by the citric acid cycle [2].
Since PLGA undergoes such a hydrolysis they will
most probably be degraded short time after adminis-
tration and hence involves a low plausibility for
distribution into the environment. On the other hand,
these particles are to be distributed at nanolevels that
entail that different biological and physiological
effects may occur. For instance, studies have shown
that toxicity of particles increases with the decrease of
particle size and increase of overall surface area [18].
Evaluation of the factors that affect nanomaterial
exposure requires measurement of properties as
particle size, shape, surface area, and surface chem-
istry with implications for the safety by application.
Although the PGLA nanoparticles are biodegradable
they may also have higher reactivity due to their
increased surface area; hence have a potential to
interfere with natural processes. These problems
could be classified as matters of scientific ignorance
rather than uncertainty, and be relegated beyond the
scope of precaution. But as these altered properties
are based on documented research, there is a case for
according the plausibility by a case-by-case approach
based on previous or analogous use and in relation to
the novelty at the nanolevel, and thus as matters of
uncertainty.
The most prevailing questions that need to be
answered in relation to the environmental and health
implications of nanomaterials are: What are the fate
and transport mechanisms of nanoparticles? Which
exposure routes are relevant? How do nanoparticles
impact the natural environment including animal and
human health? Vaccines with PLGA as carrier may be
released during vaccination and from the vaccines.
Although the PLGA is biodegradable, it is at present
not known if the PLGA used in vaccines may have
changed biodistribution patterns as well as persis-
tence. Although encapsulation ensures more direct
uptake by cells it also entails release of the antigens
over extended periods of time. Another issue concerns
PLGAs adsorption tendency and degree of aggrega-
tion at a macro versus a smaller level that also need to
be investigated. Predatory animals can also spread the
PGLA and the vaccines in the environment. Accord-
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purpose to investigate the stability of PGLA particles
in aquatic systems, uptake in aquatic organisms,
including marine fish and mammals. But even if
these acts represent irreversible alterations to the
environment, it is not obvious that they represent
harmful alterations. Also after we establish with
reasonable certainty the extent to which PGLA based
vaccines have irreversible effects on the environment,
we still depend on value judgments to decide whether
this is harmful.
In this context it is worthwhile to bear in mind the
early days of the debate surrounding genetically
modified organisms, where several proponents of
growing genetically modified plants commercially
pointed out that no escape of transgenes to wild
relatives had been recorded, and it was unlikely that it
would happen on any significant scale. When such
escape was documented some years later, the propo-
nents of the genetically modified crops did not see
this as a problem for their conception of this as a
fruitful technology. Typical arguments are that trans-
genes generally give the wild plants small competitive
advantages and transgene spread should not be
considered to be more harmful to the environment
than gene flow from traditional plant breeding crops
[31,33]. Despite the fact that this spread is irrevers-
ible, many consider this spread to represent accept-
able harm. We can also imagine that if these
transgenic wild plants became ‘superweeds’ [16],
threatening both crops and the diversity of ecosys-
tems, the same people could merely say that this is no
significant harm when considering the benefits of the
transgenic crops, the wide array of herbicides we have
to use to control the weed, and how much nature we
have left that will never be affected by these weeds.
Even when there is some case of irreversible and in
several ways destructive changes due to human
activity; we still depend on contestable values to give
meaning to concepts such as ‘harm’, because they are
both descriptive and normative. We have to determine
their normative content to be able to use them as
action guiding, and this can only be done through the
discussion of actual cases, as is clearly the intention
of the UNESCO principle. But in this area the
UNESCO version stumbles on similar problems as
the strong versions, such as the Wingspread state-
ment. It is not enough to state that plausible threats of
irreversible harm should lead to precautionary meas-
ures, as long as we have no way to ascertain what is
to count as ‘harm’. Furthermore, in the UNESCO
version the concept of morally unacceptable harm is
interlinked with serious and effectively irreversible
which is problematic. How can these terms be used to
choose the best action in an open and flexible way?
The question of what is to count as harm is highly
dependent on a scientific analysis, involving both the
disciplines involved in development of the technology
in question as well as they who have competence in
ecology and biology. Moreover the complexities of
the technical issues of novel technological products
do also represent insurmountable obstacles to a well-
informed public value discussion. Hence, we will
argue that instead of using participatory processes for
choosing actions, a better approach would be to
identify different societal conceptions that can be
used in comparison with the present biological and
ecological understanding [32].
Inequitable to Present or Future Generations
Inequitable distribution certainly is morally wrong,
but how is it possible to estimate distribution of
benefits and harm of future applications of a new
technology? There is a wide and growing discussion
on global justice [39,40,43,45] that demonstrates
some of the difficulties in determining what is to
count as an equitable global distribution of goods and
burdens among people living today. Solving this
question as part of a precautionary approach to
particular technology applications does not seem any
easier. Of course, in many cases this point will most
likely be irrelevant, for example when discussing
vaccines in fish. But when it is relevant, as is the case
with nanotechnology and biotechnology related issues
such as patenting, bioprospecting and strategies for
funding of research and development, the issues must
be solved in an inclusive debate rather than as part of
employing the precautionary principle to a particular
technology application. We assume this point is
included in the UNESCO version of the principle
mainly to avoid the charge that the real suffering of
existing people is sacrificed for potential suffering of
future generations.
The issue of equity in relation to precautionary
thinking seems more relevant regarding future gen-
erations. But equity concerns reasonable distribution
between members of the same society, be it a local or
80 Nanoethics (2011) 5:73–86a global community. We do not have this relationship
with future generations, and we are unable to share
goods with them on an equitable scale since we do
not know who they are, how many they will be or
what their interests will be. If we extrapolate from
known history, we can safely conclude that these
essential facts are impossible to predict. ‘Equity’ is
not a suitable moral concept in this context, since it is
connected to an ethics of reciprocity. Hans Jonas [22]
suggests that responsibility is a more basic ethical
principle than reciprocity since there can be no
reciprocity between future generations and us. For
Jonas, the fundamental lesson of technology devel-
opment is the power humankind has acquired, that in
the last instance enables us to destroy the possibility
of any future human life on earth (Ibid. 26f.). Thus he
suggests a new categorical imperative to replace the
Kantian: ‘Act in a way that makes the consequences
of your acts conform with the permanent real human
life on earth.’ (Ibid. 36)
Another important and new moral challenge
according to Jonas concerns our shared responsibility,
since our acts are collective acts. The moral impera-
tive becomes political. Our responsibility for future
generations must be at the core of any precautionary
thinking, and the UNESCO version commendably
incorporates this. This is, however, not a matter of
equity but of responsibility in the sense employed by
Jonas. We should leave an earth that gives coming
generation the opportunity to decide what kind of life
they want to lead. Environmental responsibility
relates to human existence, and suggests that the
Earth should not be left in a worse state than the state
in which we received it.
Perhaps Jonas’ perspective on environmental re-
sponsibility implies a precautionary approach; but he
adds an important caveat. We have a duty to gain
knowledge in order to contribute to the good of future
generations, which implies the acceptance of uncer-
tainty (Ibid. 28), while at the same time encouraging
innovation. A restrictive precautionary policy may
prevent rather than promote the future state of the
earth. Rather than a narrow interpretation of the
precautionary principle with emphasis on ‘avoidance
of harm’, the focus in an ethics of a responsibility
approach is directed to how we should promote a
good life also for future generations. In this context
vaccines in general may help to ensure a more stable
production in aquaculture which is important in both
rich and poor countries but also for posterity.
Although we cannot know the preferences of future
generations, we can be certain that a stable and
sustainable food supply will be as essential for them
as it is for us. On the other hand, genetic pollution
may reduce the possibility of finding and developing
alternative sources of food production. It has been
argued that fish farming involving carnivorous spe-
cies is not sustainable as it is practiced today [36], and
future food production may have to develop new
ways of exploiting marine food resources. If the use
of PLGA as carriers of vaccines in fish farming
endangers this opportunity, we have to deem it
morally unacceptable. But we do not need the
precautionary principle to discover that it is wrong
to undermine alternative marine sources of food
production. Jonas’ ethics of responsibility is more
suitable in that respect.
As illustrated above, this ultimately raises the
following questions; for whom may PGLA as carriers
for vaccines be morally unacceptable, and which
moral theories or principles should be employed? For
instance, the biotechnology industry advocates ac-
ceptable environmental and health impacts of DNA
and GM vaccines while others claim there are
unacceptable impacts. PGLA has been approved by
the FDA based on their history for use in clinical
applications [29]. Does the use at a nanolevel
represent new concerns? Does the distribution to a
new organism, fish, represent new questions? Does
the shift from medical application at a low level to
large-scale distribution in aquaculture involve new
challenges for control and monitoring? These issues
require research by different groups of scientists for
identification of potential impacts. Unless we have
some indications of the answers to these questions,
the UNESCO principle’s demand of precautionary
action against interventions that are ‘inequitable to
future generations’ will remain mere words. But the
report does provide a promising procedure for how to
avoid this charge.
Participatory Case-Based Approach as Solution?
So how does the UNESCO version attempt to avoid
the vagueness trap of precautionary thinking? The
answer may be found in the final demand of a
participatory process that shall include all affected
parties. The report claims that ‘moral judgments are
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than the ethical theories one adheres to’ [49]a n d
expresses a belief in a yet undiscovered universal
basis for ethics, forcefully stated by several previous
authors (see e.g. Jonsen and Toulmin [23]). Thus we
are more likely to reach consensus as a result of the
process. This belief in a tendency towards moral
agreement in particulars is basis for expecting
generally acceptable and more stable results of the
participatory deliberation.
Participatory processes are in the vogue in present
day technology governance. Engaging the public is
usually justified through some kind of stakeholder
theory [42] or deliberative democracy theory [7].
Although there are overlapping ideas between the
two approaches, a deliberative democracy approach
is more in keeping with the normative ideals in the
UNESCO report. According to this approach, dem-
ocratic decision-making is expressive of mutual
respect and of justice. It provides a wider argumen-
tative basis for decisions [19]a sl a yp e o p l em a yh a v e
unique, valuable contributions to complex and
controversial political issues [7,55]. In Stirling’s
[47] analysis of the rationale for public engagement,
he highlights in addition the role of public engage-
ment in restoration of legitimacy and public trust.
T h ei s s u eo ft r u s th a sa l s ob e e na r g u e db y
Macnaghten et al. [30], who considers that engage-
ments represent an extraordinary opportunity to build
a robust prospective role for the social sciences in
shaping the future of nanotechnology research and
innovation processes.
One crucial problem with participatory processes is
the fact that many people have no wish to spend time
on them, due to their lack of relevant knowledge and
lack of interest in entering extensive learning pro-
cesses, as is demonstrated in several focus groups and
interviews [21,46,48]. Therefore we should ask why it
is important to involve the public in discussions of
issues where they may lack both knowledge and the
inclination to participate.
If we assume that a participatory process can give
valuable results, we still have to question the
assumption that this process will result in a stable
normative consensus. Participatory processes open up
for a plurality of views and conflicting perspectives
that create a dilemma concerning how and when to
reach a decision, since the aim of any participatory
process in relation to the precautionary principle is
generating information for decision-making. The
UNESCO report fails to present evidence for the
claim about particular moral judgments being less
subject to plurality, and the disagreement on how to
deal with the more or less plausible harms from
distribution of any vaccines to be used in aquaculture
hardly supports their case. On the contrary; almost
everybody agrees on the theoretical assumption that
irreversible damage is wrong, but disagrees on the
particulars, and on the strategies for handling such
harm. Thus there is no guarantee that staying with
moral judgments of concrete cases will help us
resolve the moral issues involved.
In many cases the reason for disagreement is not
moral, be it theoretical or practical, but one of
plausibility of risks. For instance an analysis of the
evolution of policy discourses [8] on nanotechnolo-
gies indicated that, while gradually more participants
enter the public debate, the issues of concern have
become more narrowly defined. After a phase where
nanotechnology emerged on public and policy agen-
das, and a subsequent one in which debate about a
wide range of implications of the possibly radical
potential of nanotechnologies was expanding, a global
policy discourse that focuses primarily on environ-
mental, health and safety risks is now gaining
grounds. As Doubleday writes:
‘So rather than addressing questions of how
particular conceptions of health and the
human body are reproduced by nanotechnolo-
gy research programmes, the dominant vision
of nanotechnology as a public issue concen-
trates on the toxicology of nanoparticles.’
(Ibid., p.213)
The disagreement often concerns what future
scenarios that are likely, not the ethics of dealing
with these scenarios. The discussion can also be
framed as a psychological one rather than a factual or
a moral disagreement: risk-averse versus risk-
accepting personalities, although it is reasonable to
regard the psychological state to some extent to be
interdependent on beliefs [24]. In short, the assump-
tion that disagreement is moral and can be resolved
through discussing cases rather than theories and
principles appears to be misguided. In issues like
these it is even difficult to construct meaningful
distinctions between empirical facts and value judg-
ments. For instance, with PLGA as carriers of
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and no scientific consensus of the various type of
uncertainty embedded with its use. The problem is the
issue regarding identification and interpretation of
relevant data and approaches for gathering more data
rather than how to handle these data in practical
reality.
Even if the UNESCO definition of the precaution-
ary principle clearly is more specific and a better
guide for regulation than the paradigmatic weak and
strong versions preceding it, the UNESCO version
stumbles on the assumption about less plurality in
moral judgments. We have no reason to expect this
because interpretations of the issues at stake differ, as
is exemplified by the continuing debate between
Europe and the USA, Canada and Argentine on the
moral acceptability of the release of genetically
modified organisms [52].
Responsibility Versus Precaution
The UNESCO version replaces scientific probability
with plausibility, and emphasizes proportionality of
action relevant to ‘the seriousness of the potential
harm, with consideration of their positive and nega-
tive consequences, and with an assessment of the
moral implications of both action and inaction.’ In
this way it is neither reducible to a demand for risk
assessment nor an unreflexive obstacle to technolog-
ical progress due to a myopic risk perspective. But
assuming that the precautionary principle is meant to
be action guiding, the UNESCO principle provides no
way to decide what is to count as scientific plausibil-
ity in a situation of scientific disagreement. Especially
in new and controversial areas of research, such
disagreement is common.
The UNESCO report is right in that the responsi-
bility for making a decision on technology applica-
tions is and should be political mediated by a wide,
open and responsible debate in accordance with the
ideal of deliberative democracy [7]. The debate must
be based on best scientific knowledge. We will argue
that this calls for a privileged position for experts
(natural and social scientists, as well as ethicists) in
accordance with Aristotle’s theory of practical argu-
mentation where accepted opinions (endoxa) include
those of the majority as well as those of the majority
or the most respected of the wise, i.e. the experts [3].
The Aristotelian privileging of expertise does not
express elitism or disrespect for the rationality of lay
people, but a reasonable assumption about the value
of knowledge and understanding gained from years of
specialization in theory and practice. As emphasized
above, lay people have an important role to play in
these debates, since they can represent an outside
view, serving as corrective to myopic tendencies both
within the nanotechnology community as well as
within nanoethics. Moreover it has also been argued
that lay people may see matters that the experts
discount or fail to notice since they are immersed in
the scientific culture with its epistemological and
ethical assumptions [55].
In the current governance debate, however, the
belief in the value of public participation is too
strong. As we have pointed out, there is evidence
that lay people themselves reject this role. Since
they present sound arguments for this rejection, in
addition to ‘voting with their feet’, using delibera-
tive democracy theory to say that they should get
involved is a self-defeating exercise. In several of
the studies, lay people express that they either do
trust experts or that they wish to do so. This can be
read as an implicit claim that the experts should be
trustworthy, in the sense that they should take
responsibility for the moral acceptability of what
they do.
In order to fill that role of taking responsibility in
our current project, we need scientific studies of the
effects prior to using the nanoparticle based products
commercially, where scientists determine the uncer-
tainties and suggest the range of possible outcomes
which is subsequently followed up by targeted
research. However, with regard to nanotechnology
there are reasonable disagreement on the range of
outcomes and the plausibility of the different out-
comes. Hence, even if everybody agrees to the list of
principles for delimiting relevant harm, we will
disagree on how to balance different scientific
scenarios. For example, the different scientific dis-
ciplines that are presently involved in the epistemic
debate employ competing models or analogies for
basic assumptions on how to frame the scope for
further research as well as with regard to regulative
frameworks. Since the principles and paradigms of
the different scientific disciplines differ, they have no
common ground to discuss means for gathering new
scientific understanding.
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to a precautionary approach that emphasizes the
necessity of initiating risk-associated research [53].
Such risk-associated research entails that the scientists
should identify uncertainty and that they should
discuss the evidence and arguments for the differing
assumptions and communicate this disagreement to
the public and political authorities. Potential threats
pointed out by respected scientists with relevant
education and practice, threats that the scientists at
the moment are unable to indicate the likelihood of,
should be communicated as part of the studies.
Recognizing fallibility is an inherent part of scientific
practice, and scientists should always regard unex-
pected damage to be likely when introducing benefi-
cial new technology.
But who are the experts that should be involved
in a best scientific practice approach as the one we
suggest here? That depends on what scientific
knowledge is relevant for the examination of risks
and uncertainties with regard to environmental,
health, social and economic effects. Valuable
insights can be drawn from science and technology
studies and the debate on precaution where a
central point has been the integration between new
technology and modern democratic society, making
the social and normative essential and internal parts
of the technology rather than mere additions and
external [42]. Regulation of the development and use
of nanoparticles as carriers for vaccines is obviously
not merely a question of nanotechnology and
aquaculture. The scientific evaluation group should
encompass a wide range of experts, including
immunologists, biologists, marine ecologists, sociol-
ogists and ethicists.
The scientists should not restrict themselves to
scientific work in a narrow sense. Their research is
based on certain values and will have consequences
for nature and society. They have a duty to
question the soundness of these values and to
evaluate the consequences should be regarded as
good or acceptable—or they should ensure that
somebody else does this reflexive examination.
Since most scientists lack the background and
resources necessary for this kind of ethical analy-
sis, their duty to assess the values and implications
of their research activity would be fulfilled if their
research integrates social science and ethics per-
spectives on the relevant science and technology.
This should not be regarded as ‘outsourcing’ of
ethics, as is often done in ELSA-research. The
scientists have a duty to take part in mutual
learning processes with the humanities researchers
through discussion of the technology in this
societal and ethical perspective. Only by this
interdisciplinary cooperation can the public be
given resources that are valuable for their partici-
pation in an open debate of the relevant issues.
Hence, our approach can be considered as a return
to a principle of best scientific practice based on an
ethics of responsibility.
To avoid morally unacceptable consequences for
future (or even present) inhabitants of the earth, we
need to pay heed to the words of the scientific
community and combine it with common sense
expressed in the ethics of responsibility. We have a
moral responsibility to anticipate and prevent negative
consequences irrespective of the degree of human
contribution to the potential harm. This kind of
responsibility is not fully captured in precautionary
thinking where only human activity triggers the moral
obligation. Thus the problem lies in the collective
nature of responsibility [22].
There are incentives that seek to promote a broad
sense of responsibility [26]s u c ha st h eE U ’s ‘Code
of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nano-
technologies Research’ [6] and voluntary measures.
However, we see the concept of responsibility not to
only endorse and stimulate reflective awareness in
order for researchers to be able to communicate
some of the issues at stake to the general public or
enable the scientists to reflect on the conditions they
perform their research under, as well as the choices
they make. It is also about enhancing deliberation on
the course of action of all stages of the development
process that leads to the context of the end user in
ways that for instance will realize the expressed
deliverables promised to and endorsed by public
bodies. In order to carry out this kind of responsibility
reflection,scientificandtechnologicalexpertisemustbe
supplemented with ethical expertise. Although one can
discuss towhatextentdecidingonthe goodisanareaof
expertise, systematic normative reflection certainly is
[44]. Thus, some kind of interdisciplinary expert-based
reflexive work is necessary in order to fulfil the
demands of scientific responsibility.
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There are many formulations and versions of the
precautionary principle, and the debates raised by
formulations of the principle have been valuable for
recognizing a changed role for science and technol-
ogy in democratic societies. Most attempts at work-
able formulations of the principle, however, have
been met with criticism for either being vacuous or
too narrow and leaving too much to discretion.
Although the UNESCO version makes the best
attempt so far to avoid these pitfalls, it does not fully
succeed, also this version is plagued by vague key
concepts and questionable normative assumptions.
We suggest instead that the precautionary principle
need to be supplemented by combining the ideal of
best scientific practice with the insights of Jonas’
ethics of responsibility to ensure a sound basis for
political decisions on technology regulation. On
controversial issues where the stakes are high and
facts contested, such as use of nanotechnology,
valuable insights from the debate on precaution is
retained, but futile attempts at finding a formulation
of a particular principle is replaced by a regulatory
approach based on a wide scientific evaluation of the
values and implications of particular technology
applications. This represents no attempt at solving
the problems in the definition and application of the
precautionary principle, nor does it avoid the vague-
ness problems. We wish to redirect the attention
towards the issue of scientific and political responsi-
bility as an alternative framework for the discussion
of how to handle potentially harmful use of new
technology. This responsibility is aimed at scientists
as we consider expert arguments will and should carry
more weight than public argument since they have the
responsibility for making a thorough and sound
assessment of the technology and share their best
opinions with the public and political authorities.
Involving lay people should be a way to widen our
perspectives, and we should be careful to avoid
shifting the burden of responsibility from politicians
to the general public.
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